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DECLASSIFIED
ACTION REPORT
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
FLEET
SERIAL 0479 - 15 FEBRUARY 1942
REPORT OF JAPANESE RAID ON PEARL HARBOR,
7 DECEMBER 1941. [VOLUME 3]
ENCLOSURE E- NARRATIVE REPORTS OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.
PART 2- USS NARWHAL (SS167)
TO:
USS ZANE (DMS14)
4003
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
In reply refer to No.
BB38/
Preparer A16-3/(0153) U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA 10/jm
Hawaiian Area,
December 16, 1941.
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commanding Officer
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S PENNSYLVANIA'S Report of Action during
Enemy Air Attack morning of Sunday, 7 December,
1941.
References: (a) Cincpac conf despatch 102102 of Dec.1941.
(b) Cincpac conf mgm 111310 of Dec. 1941
1. Reports of the Action of December 7. in accordance with references, - of the extent and sequence of attacks, of the times of
attacks, of the number of planes involved -, are based on conflicting and
confused testimony of many observers, including the the Commanding
Officer, none of whom could observe more than a part of the action at any
one time.
2. STATUS AND CONDITION OF SHIP BEFORE ACTION.
In dry-dock No. 1, with three propeller shafts removed.
Destroyers CASSIN and DOWNES in dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. New dry-dock
West of PENNSYLVANIA dry but not occupied. Floating dock West of new dry-dock occupied by destroyer SHAW. Cruiser HELENA with OGLALA alongside
dock at berth B-2, (PENNSYLVANIA'S normal berth) astern of PENNSYLVANIA.
Across the channel in berth F-3 - CALIFORNIA; berth F-5 - MARYLAND
inboard, OKLAHOMA outboard; berth F-6 - TENNESSEE inboard, WEST VIRGINIA
outboard; berth F-7 ARIZONA; berth F-6 - NEVADA.
PENNSYLVANIA had been excused from anti-aircraft drills while
and because of being in dry-dock (no, drills scheduled for Sunday).
Machine guns in foremast were, however, manned. A Condition Watch of
anti-aircraft personnel was available on board but not on guns.
Commanding Officer and First Lieutenant were aboard, together with
department representatives from each department. No orders to alert
were received.
Ship was receiving steam, power and water from the Yard.
3. NARRATIVE OF ACTION.
First Call to colors had been sounded, when about 0757, explosions were heard on the end of Ford Island abreast 0802 to 0805 (exact time not known), PENNSYLVANIA
commenced firing at enemy planes - reported as first ship opening
fire by personnel as board. All anti-aircraft batteries were
rapidly brought into action. After release of torpedoes, three
planes came in low from the port beam, strafing PENNSYLVANIA, - strafing attack not effective. During the torpedo attack, one
enemy plane was observed to burst into flames about 2,000 yards on
the starboard bow.
Dive bombing attacks, torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor and
dive bombing attacks on Hickam Field continued.
Sometime between 8 and 8:30 a.m. the NEVADA was observed to
be getting underway and had reached a point about on the
PENNSYLVANIA'S starboard quarter, distant about 600 yards when a
dive bombing attack was observed to be approaching the PENNSYLVANIA
on the port bow, 10 or 15 planes coming in succession, low
attitude. This was between 0830 and 0900. This attack apparently
was directed at the PENNSYLVANIA and the two destroyers in dock.
These attacking planes were taken under heavy fire. Just before
reaching PENNSYLVANIA about two-thirds appeared to swerve to the
left, a number of them dropping bombs at the NEVADA, with some
misses ahead, some misses astern, and at least one hit apparently
in the vicinity of the bridge. The NEVADA was observed to stop.
At the same time, other planes of this attack passed to port
and over the PENNSYLVANIA and dropped bombs which fell in the water
beyond the caisson. Except probably for machine gun bullets it is
believed that the PENNSYLVANIA was not hit during this attack.
One of the dive bombers dropped a bomb on the SHAW in the The NEVADA observed to slowly swing around, head to port During the period 0830 to 0915 - HIGH BOMBING ATTACK.
About 5 high bombing attacks were observed to pass over the
PENNSYLVANIA, one from the port bow, one from ahead and one from ahead
passing to starboard, two from astern. These attacks were in "V" formation generally with from 4 to 6 planes in each formation, usually
five. Formations maintained straight courses and I estimate were at
an altitude of 10,000 to 12,000 feet.
The first attack coming in from ahead and passing to starboard
is believed to have bombed the battleships across the channel.
The second attack coming in slightly on the port bow dropped
bombs on the ships in the drydock, one heavy bomb hit the destroyer
DOWNES in the dock ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA, one hit the dock approximately abreast frame 20 starboard of the PENNSYLVANIA and one
hit the boat deck of the PENNSYLVANIA a few feet abaft 5"/25 gun No.
7, passing through the boat deck and detonating in the casemate of
5"/51 gun No. 9. The fifth bomb is believed to have struck the water
outside the dock.
The third high bombing attack from ahead, appeared to drop bombs shortly after passing overhead on battleships across the
channel.
The bomb hits on the PENNSYLVANIA and DOWNES occurred at 0906.
All high bombing attacks were fired on by all batteries. 5"
bursts appeared to have been accurate, but later it was estimated that fuse settings were too short and that the bombing formation was
not being reached, perhaps by several thousand feet.
4. SPORADIC ATTACKS.
Sporadic attacks continued for some 15 minutes afterwards.
Last observed attack was from a plane passing to the South at a low
altitude along the port beam of the PENNSYLVANIA. About thirty
machine gun hits in the shield around the maintop machine gunners may have come from this plane. These machine gun bullets did not
penetrate the shield. This plane was taken under heavy fire by our
port battery and was hit by the machine gun on the port side of the
stack while going away and crashed in the hospital grounds. This
destruction of this plane is practically certain (observers on claim
to have destroyed six enemy planes. There is fairly good proof of two
having been hit by this ship, but there is no way to confirm the other
claims).
5. FLOODING OF DRY-DOCK.
Flooding of dry-dock was started about 0920. At this time both
destroyers ahead were heavily on fire. The bomb hit on dock at 0907
had cut yard power, and subsequently power on the ship for lights, gun
operation, etc., was taken from the ship's storage batteries. At the
same time, fire main pressure, being received from the yard, was cut
off.
Fires were lighted under No. 4 boiler, beginning at 0830.
Raising steam on board was hampered because of the smoke coming from a
child boiler. This smoke interfered with anti-aircraft fire, so that
it had to be minimized. At 1010 the dock had become sufficiently
flooded. Fire and bilge pumps on the ship were started, and at 1028
power on ship was taken on two generators.
6. FIRE IN THE DOCK.
Both destroyers ahead were on fire from stem to stern, and
fire was transmitted to oil on the water in dock, setting fire to
the paint on the starboard bow of the PENNSYLVANIA. Fire was being
fought by hose from the dock, on the side of the CASSIN. No hose was
available for fighting fire on the DOWNES.
About 0930, explosions on the destroyers ahead began to take
place, and at 0941, warheads on DOWNES exploded on the starboard side,
covering the area with debris. A section of torpedo tube, weighting
between 500 and 1,000 lbs. struck on the PENNSYLVANIA'S forecastle.
Precautionary measures were taken on the bow of the PENNSYLVANIA to
prevent the spread of the fire internally. Aluminum paint in
compartments A-102 and A-602-1 melted and flowed down to the bottom of
the compartments. Fire was brought under control before serious
damage to the PENNSYLVANIA resulted.
The CASSIN, from which part of the bottom of the hull had been
removed for dock work, rolled over on the DOWNES during the fire.
7. DAMAGE TO PENNSYLVANIA.
A 500-lb. bomb dropped from high altitude bomber, 10,000 to
12,000 feet, penetrated the boat deck inside the protective shield and
just abaft No. 7, 5"/25. cal. gun. After passing through this deck,
apparently it was either deflected or rolled slightly in the
compartment before detonating. The detonation caused the boat deck
to open up for a space of about 20' X 20', opening up upward, and the
casemate deck was opened up in a similar area, opening up downward.
The bulkhead abaft Gun No. 9, 5"/51 cal. was blown out, and gun was
put out of action. Explosion wrecked a considerable part of galley
equipment and caused fuel oil from the service tank to run into the
decks below.
The explosion blast and fragments dished in the main deck and
penetrated to the second deck. 3" ammunition was being passed through
the compartment on the main deck just forward of 3" clipping room
serving No. 3, 3"/50 cal. gun on quarter deck. At the time of the
explosion, boxes containing about 24 rounds of 3" were in this
compartment. Of these, cartridge cases of 8 - 3" projectiles were
perforated, the fragments causing the propellant powder to burn, but
none exploded.
Fragments on the boat deck struck a 40' motor sailing launch
in the skids perforating the side in a number of places. This motor
launch probably saved some personnel manning port guns.
This bomb explosion caused fire in the casemate and on the
main deck and on the second deck. Fire was difficult to put out
because of lack of pressure on fire mains, and because of difficulty
of extinguishing fire in the painted cork lining on bulkheads. A
large number of fire extinguishers were used. Fire, water and oil
caused damage to officers' rooms on second deck in vicinity of
explosion.
Casing of ammunition hoist to 5"/25 battery was dished in by
the explosion putting this ammunition hoist out of action for the time
being. Three flights of the hoist were also buckled.
Degaussing cable in vicinity of explosion was ruptured,
necessitating complete repairs. (Degaussing cable was also cut in a
number of other places by fragments).
Platform for operation of Gun No. 7, 5"/25 was raised by the
explosion and this gun was adjacent to the large section of deck blown
up. After explosion gun would not be trained to the limits of train
forward, but after casualties had been replaced gun was continued in
action.
Power failures from the dock were frequent necessitating using
local control on one battery practically throughout the engagement.
This battery power could only be used for one side.
8. CASUALTIES.
The bomb explosion in casemate No. 9, caused the death of
about 26 men and two officers. One officer, the First Lieutenant,
Lieutenant Commander J. E. Craig, U.S.N., was probably passing through
the compartment to carry out specially assigned duties aft.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Richard R. Rall, Medical Corps, U.S.N., was
at the Battle Dressing Station in the Warrant Officer's Mess Room,
when killed. Of the men, a number were killed on Gun No. 7, a larger number
in casemate No. 9, some additional in the "V" division compartment on
the main deck under casemate No. 9, and some in the vicinity of No.
3, 3" gun.
One man, manning the donkey boiler on the dock (supplying
steam to the ship) was killed, probably either by a machine gun 9. DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT.
The conduct of all officers and men was of the highest order.
There was no flinching. There was no necessity of urging men to
action. Rather was there perhaps in some cases over zeal in the
matter of expending ammunition. The Command Officer would be glad
to recommend each individual participating in the action for
distinguished conduct, but recognizes that this cannot be well There were, however, a number of cases of wounded men insisting on continuing on station, serving guns, under order to battle dressing
stations to have the wounds attended. A complete list of these is not
yet available.
A number of yard workmen assisted in handling lines, fighting
fires and one even joined the ammunition group of a gun's crew.
It was noted by everyone participating in the action that
after it had been going on for an hour and a half to two hours, each
officer and man experienced a heavy thirst which was largely
unquenchable, requiring excessive drinking of water. This confirms
the necessity of having water at all battle stations in readiness for
action.
10. EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION.
At about 1030 the PENNSYLVANIA sent motor launches to West
Loch for more ammunition. At about 1800 complete replacement of
ammunition had been made. The first motor launch returned with
ammunition during the noon hour. It was impossible to make a complete check of ammunition expended and received, however, the
estimated expenditure was:
5"/25 - 650 rounds.
3"/50 - 350 rounds.
.50 cal. - 60,000 rounds
3"/50 caliber was in a number of instances fired at high
altitude bombers, beyond their range. Under the conditions it was
probably unwise to attempt to stop this. .50 caliber was fired at
high altitude bombers on a number of occasions with a consequent waste of ammunition. Steps were taken to correct this. 11.
REPAIRS.
Preparatory work for repairing damage of bomb hit was started
by the ship's force abut 1400. Later, - the following day, this work
was carried on by yard forces and ship's force together. One 5"/51
gun and mount was obtained by the ship's force from the WEST VIRGINIA
for installation on this ship.
In addition, No. 3, 5"/25 gun, was slightly bulged by our own fire. New gun was obtained from WEST VIRGINIA by the ship's
force.
12. It is not practicable to estimate the total number
of planes that participated in the attack on the ships in Pearl Harbor
and Ford Island, but I would say at least 60. C. M. COOKE, Jr.
Combatships
Combatfor
It is estimated repairs will be completed on December 17.
Ship was ready to go to sea immediately upon undocking on December 12,
with exception of not having No. 9, 5"/51 gun ready.
Copy to: CBD-2
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